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Recognition in International Law: A
Functional Reappraisalt
The ambiguous nature of the doctrine of recognition in international
law has contributed to significant academic dispute.1 At least two major
theories have been advanced to provide a framework for this part of
international law. The "constitutive theory" views recognition as the
voluntary act of the recognizing state; the "declaratory theory" accepts
recognition as automatic.2
Recognition has both legal and political meanings, both internal and
external consequences for the recognizing state.3 The law which applies
in one set of circumstances may not necessarily apply in another. In
strictly public international law acceptance of a declaratory theory re-
quiring immediate admission of the fact of existence of a foreign state
seems necessary. If, however, domestic legal issues are also involved, a
state may legitimately impose other conditions of its own law and policy,
resulting in the operation of some elements of a constitutive standard.
Such a distinction can readily be discerned within the existing law. It
is consistent both with the maintenance of international order and
with the protection of domestic legal integrity.
I. CLARIFICATION OF TERMINOLOGY
A restricted vocabulary has been used to describe a large quantity
of concepts. One distinction traditionally made in the literature is that
between recognition of a state and recognition of a government. In the
traditional jurisprudence the state is the unit or persona of interna-
tional law which is capable of holding rights within the system. 4 A new
t Fred L. Morrison, A.B. 1961, University of Kansas; B.A. 1963, Oxford University;
M.A. 1965, Ph.D. 1966, Princeton University; J.D. 1967, University of Chicago.
1 The most significant of the recent academic examinations of this subject have been
CHEN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF RECOGNITION (1951); LAUERPAcHT, RECOGNITION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1947); PATEL, RECOGNITION IN THE LAW OF NATIONS (1959); and
Kelsen, Recognition in International Law: Theoretical Observations, 35 AM. J. INT'L L.
605 (1941).
2 An explanation of the two theories is undertaken later. See text accompanying notes
14-44 infra.
3 Kelsen, supra note 1, makes the latter distinction, but does not follow it through.
4 This does not prevent the creation of new personae, e.g. international organizations,
within the system. Cf. text accompanying note 70 infra.
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state appears within the system only upon the bifurcation or dissolution
of some other state or empire.5 With the extinction of these empires,
the problems of state recognition are becoming more matters of legal
history than living problems of practical consequence. 6 The recognition
of governments has been treated as a different matter. Governments
are mere agents of the primary abstract entity, the state.7 Where govern-
ments or heads of state succeed one another through the constitutional
processes of the society, there is normally no official notice taken of the
transition.8 Where, however, violent or substantial changes in the con-
stitutional structure take place, a decision must be made by each
external state whether to recognize the new authorities.9 The problem
is especially difficult when internal war results in the existence over a
prolonged period of two or more authorities each controlling a sub-
stantial segment of the territory and purporting to act for the state as
a whole.
The formal difference between recognition of states and recognition
of governments is considerable. The fundamental rights of a recognized
state, e.g., territorial integrity, are protected even though it does not
have a recognized government; an unrecognized state may not even
have these minimal rights. The practical difference is, however, un-
important. Nonrecognition of a new state is normally concomitant with
acknowledgement that the territory thereof is rightfully within the
sovereignty of some third power. Any conflict thus becomes simply an
internal power struggle, and any extraneous government which inter-
venes will do so as an "ally" of one of the contesting factions. This com-
ment will attempt to minimize the importance of the distinction
between these two types, but will concentrate upon the recognition of
governments. With only a few exceptions, state recognition has been
accompanied by governmental recognition. 10
Two frequent confusions of terminology should be mentioned here.
5 Thus, after the First World War, a number of Eastern European states arose out of
the ruins of the Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires, while more recently African and
Asian states have emerged from the dissolution of colonial empires.
6 The dissolution of post-colonial federations, like Malaysia (from which Singapore
claimed its independence) and Nigeria, might offer new vitality for an old distinction.
7 "It is a fundamental rule of international law that every independent State is entitled
to be represented in the international sphere by a government . LAuTERPACHT, op.
cit. supra note 1, at 87. Cf. CEiN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 97-104.
8 E.g., the succession of one duly elected British government for another. In cases like
the Greek military coup of 1967, an assumption of "constitutionality" may save a recog-
nizing state from making embarrassing diplomatic and political statements.
9 The state may continue to be recognized, without the recognition of any particular
government.
10 Among the exceptions are the Eastern European states which were recognized after
the First World War before their governments were recognized.
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One is caused by the unfortunately vague use of the words de facto and
de jure. The distinction between these terms has been made at least
three ways. 11 Because of the inherent confusion involved in their use,
these terms will not be used. A second confusion is between recognition
and the establishment of diplomatic relations. 12 While the establish-
ment of diplomatic relations implies recognition, recognition can exist
without diplomatic intercourse.' 3
II. TRADITIONAL DOCnUNES
The two major traditional doctrines regarding the recognition of
states are the constitutive and the declaratory. Some authors have suc-
ceeded in moderating their viewpoints by compromising elements of
both approaches into a consistent doctrine. 14 This comment will seek
to follow the same course.
The constitutive view is largely dominated by legal positivists.
11 One distinction was proposed by the 1936 session of the Institut de Droit Inter-
national: the term de facto should be used to describe "provisional or limited" recognition,
and the term de jure should be used to describe "definite or complete" recognition.
Institut de Droit International, Resolutions Concerning the Recognition of New States
and New Governments, reprinted in 30 Am. J. INT'L L. SupP. 185, 186 (1936). Since all
recognition is subject to withdrawal upon the termination of statehood, this seems little
more than a suggestion that the permanence of a state or government is questionable. It
has no clear juristic consequences.
A second usage of the terms is more judicial in origin. Some courts have used de facto
to describe a government which does, as a matter of fact, exist, but with which the foreign
office of the foreign state has no official relations. De jure governments are those certified
by the foreign office to be legitimate and with which it has official relations. See, e.g., the
certificate of the British Foreign Office, The Arantzazu Mendi, [1938] P. 233, 242.
The third usage is frankly political. "De facto" is sometimes used by foreign offices or
politicians to describe a government which clearly exists, but which does not measure up
to the standards of legitimacy which that office or person requires of others. In the nine-
teenth century the standard was one of legal continuity, rejecting revolutionary changes
unacknowledged by the "parent" state. See generally, Alexandrowicz, The Theory of
Recognition in Fieri, 34 Barr. Y.B. INT'L L. 176 (1958); Lyons, The Conclusiveness of the
Foreign Office Certificate, 23 Barr. Y.B. INT'L L. 240 (1946). More recently, the United States
has used such a policy to deny recognition to nonpopular revolutionary governments in
Latin America. It also had effect in the Stimson Doctrine of nonrecognition of territorial
changes accomplished through aggressive action, in which the United States joined the
League of Nations. Cf. Williams, Some Thoughts on the Doctrine of Recognition in
International Law, 47 HARv. L. Rlv. 776, 781 (1934).
12 Cf. text accompanying notes 72-74 infra.
13 Similarly, suspension of diplomatic relations does not imply suspension of recognition.
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 408-12 (1964). Cf. the certificate in
Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba v. Steamship Ruth Ann, 228 F. Supp. 501, 503-05
(D.P.R. 1964). And there are means other than entry into diplomatic relations to confer
recognition. See Graham, The League of Nations and the Recognition of States, 3 FACULTY
RESEACH LEcTUREs OF U.C.L.A. 1, 31 (1933); KUNz, Dm ANERKENNUNG VON STAATEN UND
RiEGIRUNGFN IM V6LxERREcHT 20-25 (1928).
14 LAUrERPAcHT, op. cit. supra note 1, is an example.
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Kelsen,15 Anzilotti, 16 Triepel,17 Wheaton, 8 and Oppenheim 9 can be
cited in support of it. As Oppenheim stated, the constitutive theory
provides that: "A state is and becomes an international person through
recognition only and exclusively."' 20 Thus a new state can acquire rights
and duties in international law only when older states formally recog-
nize it. The emphasis is on the formal act of recognition, rather than
upon any factual basis which there may be to support it. Even though
it may possess all of the other criteria of statehood, a new community
cannot claim to participate in international law until there has been
a formal act of recognition. An analogy can be drawn to the creation of
a corporation in domestic legal systems through the formal act of
chartering.
This positivism provides a basis for obligation in international law.
By describing the first act of recognition as a pactum, the theorist can
infer consent to all customary international law and thus reduce the
system to one basic principle: pacta sunt servanda.21 While this legal
fiction provides a method of tying new states to an existing international
order, its own artificiality is a serious weakness. Should there not be
more firm basis of obligation than mere implied consent? Under the
strict constitutive view there can be no "duty" to recognize, 22 because
there is no one to whom that "duty" might be owed until after the act
of recognition itself.23
The two basic criticisms of the constitutive theory are that it is
logically unsound and morally objectionable. The constitutive theory
brings a state from nothingness into being by the mere act of recog-
nition.24 Accordingly, a new state will "exist" as to those states which
15 Kelsen, supra note 1.
16 ANzLor, CouRs DE DRorr INTERNATIONAL 159-77 (3d ed. French transl. 1929).
17 TmEL, VOLKEI.ECHT UND LANDEsRECHT 63-81 (1899).
18 WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LA w 30-31 (6th ed. 1855). See also WHEATON,
ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 38-48 (6th English ed. Keith 1929).
19 I OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 109 (1905).
20 Id. at 119.
21 ANzumoTr, op. cit. supra note 16, at 161; cf. Triepel's Vereinbarung, TRmIEPE op. cit.
supra note 17, at 63-81.
22 It is here that Lauterpacht departs from the strict constitutive theory, admitting a
duty of the older states to perform the constitutive act. LAUTERPAcHT, op. cit. supra note 1,
at 26-37, 73-77.
23 "Is an existing state obliged to recognize a new community as a state, if this new
community, according to the opinion of the existing state, fulfills the conditions laid down
by international law? Such an obligation, however desirable, is not stipulated by inter-
national law. Existing states are only empowered-they are not obliged-to perform the
act of recognition." Kelsen, supra note 1, at 609-10.
24 "Whether one likes the situation or not from the political or moral angle, a state is
compelled diplomatically or judicially to take notice de facto or de jure of the existence
of another state. Any other attitude lends to such absurdities of pretending that at a
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recognize it, while not existing as to those states which do not. The
artificiality thus introduced is a serious flaw in a system of law directed
at practical relationships. Furthermore, the constitutive view is unable
to deal with the recognition of governments on the same footing as the
recognition of states. Governments clearly cannot be "constituted" by
the recognizing state, although they can be admitted to the rights which
the pre-existing state possessed.25
The more serious objections to the theory are based on its moral
implications. Nonrecognition of a state means that the citizens of that
state may not be protected by international law, either in war or in
peace. This, indeed, is Lauterpacht's main objection to the strict con-
stitutive theory.20 The "family of nations" would become merely a
mutual admiration society. Nonrecognition (which, one must remem-
ber, is discretionary) could serve as a license for invasion without legal
responsibility.27
The opposing view is the "declaratory." It is supported by writers
who have less commitment to the consistency of legal dogmatism than
to the efficacy of a legal order. Brierly,28 Moore,29 Verdross,30 Chen,31
Kunz,32 and Briggs 33 can be listed in support of this theory. The basic
tenet of the approach is that international law is an objective system,
which dictates the conditions upon which a state becomes a member of
the international community. When a state has fulfilled these condi-
tions, it automatically becomes subject to the rights and duties of
international law, without any formal action on the part of the other
members of the international system. As Moore says, "The rights and
attributes of sovereignty belong to it independently of all recognition,
but it is only after it has been recognized that it is assured of exercising
them." 34 Much as an infant attains majority without express recogni-
given moment something does not exist and, then, by a magic flourish of a pen, it comes
into being-as if you revived a mummy." Brown, The Effects of Recognition, 86 AM. J.
INT'L L. 106, 107 (1942).
25 Another absurdity thus results: nonrecognition of a government in a recognized
state may be an international delict, but nonrecognition of the state itself cannot be. Cf.
Kelsen, supra note 1, at 614-16.
26 LAuTERPAcHT, op. cit. supra note 1, at 52-55.
27 KUNz, DIE ANERKENNUNG VON STAATEN UND REGIERUNGEN IM V6LKERRECHT 89 (1928),
gives examples of the type of reasoning which would justify aggressive attacks under the
constitutive theory.
28 BRIERLY, THE LAw OF NATIONS 81-85 (1928).
29 1 MOORE, A DIGrEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 72-74 (1906).
30 VERDROSS, VL.ERRECHT 158-91 (1950).
31 CHEN, Op. cit. supra note 1.
32 KUNZ, op. cit. supra note 27.
33 Tan LAW OF NATIONS 113-17, 125-32 (Briggs ed. 1952).
34 1 MooRE, A DxGsr OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 72 (1906).
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tion in most domestic systems, a community which has satisfied the
objective conditions of international law obtains statehood. This neces-
sitates a set of objective standards; the traditional ones are population,
territory, independence, and the existence of a government.35 Examples
of the declaratory approach can be found both in a 1936 statement of
the Institut de Droit International 0 and in the Charter of the Organiza-
tion of American States.37
The declaratory approach has the advantage of directly accommo-
dating the problems of governmental recognition. Governments clearly
cannot be "constituted" by recognition, but their existence can be made
known by declaratory action of the recognizing states. The approach
is closely related to the so-called Estrada Doctrine,38 enunciated by
Mexico in 1931 in response to repeated interference by the United
States in Latin American affairs through a policy of selective recogni-
tion.39 Under this policy, the external state simply deals with whatever
government has power in the "recognized" state, without political pre-
conditions or express declarations. 40
35 Cf. LAUTERPAcHT, op. cit. supra note 1, who lists independent government, effective
authority, and defined territory, assuming the population point.
36 Article 1 states: "The recognition of a new state is the free act by which one or
more States acknowledge the existence on a definite territory of a human society politically
organized, independent of any other existing State, and capable of observing the obligations
of international law, and by which they manifest therefore their intention to consider it a
member of the international community.
"Recognition has a declaratory effect.
"The existence of a new State with all the juridical effects which are attached to that
existence, is not affected by the refusal of recognition by one or more states." Institut de
Droit International, Resolutions Concerning the Recognition of New States and New
Governments, reprinted in 30 AAr. J. INT'L L. Sup'. 185 (1936).
37 Article 9 of the Charter of the Organization of American States provides: "The
political existence of the State is independent of recognition by other States. Even before
being recognized, the State has the right to defend its integrity and independence, to
provide for its preservation and prosperity, and consequently to organize itself as it sees
fit, to legislate concerning its interests, to administer its services, and to determine the
jurisdiction and competence of its courts. The exercise of these rights is limited only by
the exercise of the rights of other states in accordance with international law." [1951]
2 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 2416, 2419.
38 Under the Estrada Doctrine, the Mexican government announced that it was "issuing
no declarations in the sense of grants of recognition, since that nation [Mexico] considers
that such a course is an insulting practice and one which, in addition to the fact that
it offends the sovereignty of other nations, implies that judgment of some sort may be
passed upon the internal affairs of those nations by other governments." Estrada Doctrine
of Recognition, 25 Am. J. INT'L L. Supp. 203 (1931).
39 El Problema del Reconocimiento de Gobiernos Extraneros, LA OPINION UNIVERSAL
SOBm LA DOCTRINA ESTRADA 7 (1931).
40 The doctrine has its own peculiar pitfalls. Some authority in the "recognizing state"
must make a determination as to which of two competing regimes in the other state is to
be treated as the government of that state. Where there is continuing civil strife, and
particularly where the old government wages a prolonged but losing defensive action, such
Recognition in International Law
While the declaratory approach operates well in the field of what is
strictly public international law, it does not adequately deal with those
private law questions in which public international law may be margin-
ally involved.41
Some attempts have been made to combine the best features of both
of the approaches to the problem of recognition. Lauterpacht starts
from a constitutive basis, but then imposes a duty upon each of the pre-
existing states to grant recognition to a new community when it has
satisfied certain objective criteria, thus importing a declaratory ele-
ment.42 Both Kunz43 and Pate44 have criticized this as a confusion of
actual and ideal international law. They claim that the theory which
Lauterpacht propounds might adequately serve the international com-
munity, but that it does not represent the present state of the law.
III. A PROPOSED VIEW
The thesis of this comment is that both approaches to the nature of
recognition are appropriate within their own limited spheres, and that
the term "recognition" covers too many concepts which may usefully
be distinguished. Both the traditional approach to international law,
with its reliance on state practice, arbitral and judicial decisions, trea-
ties, and agreements, 45 and the "sociological" approach, based on the
functional requisites for an ordered international society,4 6 support the
distinctions proposed.
In discussing the standards established in positive international law
in the traditional jurisprudence, one should carefully distinguish two
interrelated levels of applicability. The first is that minimum standard
of state action which is prescribed by the general international law for
all states and established by customary practice or explicit agreement.
The second level is that standard which a nation actually imposes upon
itself, which may be termed the particular international law of the
a determination will be important. The Estrada doctrine seems best adapted to those cases
in which there is an abrupt and dear change of power with a new government quickly in a
position of relative stability-like the typical Latin American coup.
41 Cf. text accompanying notes 81-115 infra.
42 LAUTERPACHT, op. cit. supra note 1, at 6; cf. LAuTERPACHT-OPPENHEIM,, INTER-
NATIONAL LAw 120-46 (6th ed. 1947).
43 As Kunz says: "But Lauterpacht's principal thesis, ... his assertion of a right of
recognition and a duty to recognize, is certainly entirely untenable as not being in accord
with positive international law." Kunz, Critical Remarks on Lauterpacht's "Recognition
in International Law," 44 At. J. INTL' L. 713 (1950).
44 PATEL, op. cit. supra note 1, at 23-33.
45 As typified by such writers as Brierly and by the casebook approach of authors such
as Briggs and Bishop.
46 The leading exponent of this school is certainly Professor Myres McDougal.
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state concerned. 47 A violation of the standards of general international
law by a state is a delict against the state whose interests have been
harmed. A violation of the standards of particular international law in
some state, which is not also a violation of the general standard, can
only be a transgression of the internal norms of that state.48 Such a
distinction is not subversive of international order. A state may easily
prescribe a standard in dealing with international affairs which is
higher than that actually required by the general international law. Of
course, if a state provides less protection than international standards
require, it commits an international delict if it applies its laws without
reference to the general standard.
The two standards are interrelated. A particular standard of law
may simply incorporate the general system as its body of rules govern-
ing international transactions. 49 On the other hand, particular systems
which differ from the prevailing general system may incite implicit
change in the general system, either increasing or decreasing the pro-
tection of the general law.50 In examining the jurisprudence of muni-
cipal courts and foreign offices, it is therefore necessary to discover how
far the court or office is operating by a standard which is common to all
or most international actors (and binding because part of the general
system of laws) and to what extent it is operating only under a self-
imposed legal standard or bureaucratic routine not common to the
international system or to some regional system (and binding only
because imposed by the particular municipal authority).
When there is an actual confrontation of states, the general standard
of international law must apply to settle their respective rights and
duties; in these cases, the standard of recognition is declaratory. When,
on the other hand, the confrontation is one over property rights or over
access to the courts in one state by the government of another, the
forum state may impose its own particular standard of international
47 For an example, see In re Piracy Jure Gentium, [1934] A.C. 586 (P.C.). There the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council found that international law would allow the
British government to arrest and try a larger class of persons as "pirates" than British law
itself permitted.
48 While not directly an international delict, it might raise liability for denial of justice.
49 Most systems apparently do so. For an example of a specific direction to the courts to
incorporate standards of general international law in their decisions (and to ignore the
"act of state" doctrine of the particular international law of the United States), see 22
U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1964).
50 E.g., while the first claim to a twelve mile zone of territorial waters may have been
clearly contrary to the then prevailing general international standard, the persistence and
repetition of such claims by other states may have begun to modify the general interna-
tional standard even before the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea, [1964] 2
U.S.T. 9- O.I.A. 1606.
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law; in appropriate circumstances this may be a constitutive standard.
The presentation which follows will be divided into three parts. The
first of these will deal with the rights and duties, strictly speaking, of
states and governments in their dealings with one another within the
framework of general international law not involving the adjudication
of private rights within one of the states. The second will deal with
political questions, where there are no strict rights and duties. The
final section will deal with questions arising in domestic tribunals
relating to actions or property of other states within the forum state.
A. The External Sphere of Action: Strict Law
General international law most properly affects the relations of states
with one another. Other than marginally, it does not confer rights or
duties upon individuals.51 It is the only standard which binds the
recognizing (or nonrecognizing) state in connection with acts external
to its own territory and directly in relation to some new state or govern-
ment. It does not extend to matters in the law of the recognizing state
or to physical objects within its territory. State responsibility for denial
of justice and the law of sovereign immunity may be viewed as excep-
tions to this rule. Nor does the general standard extend to political
questions, such as the decision to deal diplomatically with some new
state or government other than on the basis of strict legal rights.
General international law does include the responsibility of a state
to respect the sovereign territory of a foreign state, to respect the rights
of the other party in neutral places (as on the high seas), and to admit
the other party to the benefits of the laws of war and other customary
international law. It even includes responsibility for "denial of justice,"
although it does not interfere in domestic judicial processes except to
impose a state responsibility for damages. 2 It is submitted that the
international law of recognition on all of these questions both is, by
positive international law, and must be, from the needs of the interna-
tional community, declaratory in nature.
International law seems to require respect for the territory of a
foreign state whether or not that state (or its government) is recog-
51 TiE LAW OF NATIONS 93-98 (Briggs ed. 1952), summarizes the literature on this sub-
ject. It is clear that international law is moving away from requiring that only a state may
have rights, and is giving rights to individuals or groups, e.g., by the protection against
genocide.
52 BIcs, id. at 51, 64, postulates the case in which the municipal law and the interna-
tional law cannot be reconciled: "[T]he municipal court, whose authority is derived from
municipal law, will apply municipal law .... Whether or not this involves the State in
a violation of international law depends upon the steps taken by other branches of the
government to remedy the wrong." See generally id. at 60-65.
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nized. 53 State practice regarding recognition of territorial integrity is
apparently such that few cases arise. Any state which intervenes in the
territory of another in which it does not recognize the incumbent
government normally does so at the request of the former sovereign.
In so doing, it acts merely as an ally of that sovereign. As an ally, it
can claim the rights of its principal, and that principal can in turn rely
on its title of legitimacy.54 For the former sovereign, nonrecognition
is only evidence of a more pervasive claim to exclusive jurisdiction over
the territory. Few cases have arisen, it is suggested, because states have
followed the only practicable course and have treated governments
actually in power (whether recognized or not) with all of the respect
due them in international law, whether or not this is publicly ad-
mitted.5 5 Any other solution would lead to the admission of the legality
of hostile confrontations. The nearly uniform state practice here must
evidence a general rule of international law.
The more modern jurisprudence would seem to dictate a similar
answer. Since recognition is an artificial concept, nonrecognition can-
not be used to justify military action disturbing world order.
Again, in the use of the high seas, few cases have actually arisen in
international law. Practice simply does not allow seizure of ships for
"failure to display a recognized flag," although it certainly does allow
seizure for failure to display any flag at all. 56 American authorities, for
example, would apparently not consider East German shipping "pi-
ratical," and therefore subject to seizure, even though the recognized
West German government might approve of that action. Realistic
considerations have dictated behavior which is consistent in act, if not
in profession, with the declaratory theory. These same considerations
dictate a result in strict law which is consonant with this practice.
Indeed, in this field of activity in neutral places, international law
has provided a mechanism for official public allowance of the claims
of rebellious groups to equal treatment in international areas through
53 The most recent Arab-Israeli conflict illustrates this point cogently. When a state
(e.g., Israel) exists in fact, military action against it will be international war, whether
other nations (e.g., the Arab states) recognize it or not. Only by the use of a declaratory
theory can such conflicts be prevented.
54 And it must stand or fall according to the propriety of that action.
55 Consider the case of the involvement of the United States in Viet Nam. While the
United States does not recognize the government of North Viet Nam, it has treated it as a
foreign state and has avoided land attacks upon its territory. It has, indeed, tended to jus-
tify the air attacks against the North in terms of necessary defensive measures for the pro-
tection of American troops in the South.
56 In Naim Molvan v. Attorney-General for Palestine, [1948] A.C. 351 (P.C.), the Zionist
flag had no effective government to support it. No international issue was thus raised on
this score by the seizure of the ship.
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recognition of insurgency and belligerency.57 While for political reasons
public proclamations of this kind are no longer made,58 recognition of
"de facto governments," or of governments which do in fact control a
given territory, or simple directions to maritime officials to respect the
rights of the rebellious groups may serve the same purpose.
Next, there is the general problem of state responsibility for denial
of justice. A state may have citizens to protect within the territory of
an unrecognized state or that of a state with an unrecognized govern-
ment. It may itself have assets to protect. As the Tinoco Arbitration59
shows, recognition (at least that of a government) is not necessary for
the creation of state responsibility. As the arbitrator, William Howard
Taft, said:
[W]hen recognition vel non of a government is by such
nations determined by inquiry, not into its de facto sover-
eignty and complete governmental control, but into its ille-
gitimacy or irregularity of origin, their non-recognition loses
something of evidential weight on the issue with which those
applying the rules of international law are alone concerned. 60
Insofar as there are international rules dealing with the protection
of individuals and their property, it would seem that international
order would dictate that these attach to the benefit and detriment of
all organized communities. A state may by political action prevent
commercial intercourse or travel; it may summarily expel aliens; but
where alien commerce, travel, or residence is permitted, it should be
protected, at least on the secondary level of a remedy for "denial of
justice."
Finally, there is the problem of sovereign immunity. Here both
general and particular international law seem applicable. The need of
domestic society for legal certainty and the administration of impartial
justice is counterbalanced by the need of the international society for
the prevention of potentially hostile confrontations.
The traditional jurisprudence provides a number of cases in which
the sovereign immunity of unrecognized foreign governments has been
protected. In Wulfsohn v. Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic61
the basis for this immunity was seemingly declaratory. The plaintiff
was in a dilemma. He could not assert that the defendant did not exist;
57 Cf. LAuTERPACHT, op. cit. supra note 1, at 227-328.
58 Id. at 175-85.
59 Judicial Decisions Involving Questions of International Law, 18 Am. J. INT'L L. 147
(1924).
60 Id. at 154.
81 234 N.Y. 372, 139 N.E. 732 (1923).
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yet in asserting his existence, he also necessarily asserted his immunity.
British courts have relied more heavily than the American tribunals on
the Foreign Office certificate as proof of immunity. The British Foreign
Office, however, seems to issue these certificates more in the nature of a
statement of fact than in the nature of a declaration of recognition. The
facts stated may, indeed, conflict with its political policies and its poli-
cies regarding official recognition and the control of assets within the
United Kingdom. In both The Christina62 and The Arantzazu Mendi63
the House of Lords recognized the sovereign immunity of the Spanish
Nationalist Government, although the British Government refused to
have direct relations with it or to recognize it diplomatically. Indeed,
the ninth paragraph of the Foreign Secretary's certificate in the latter
case shows that he viewed his function as only one of gathering facts
for the courts, not one of determining legal questions:
(9) The question whether the Nationalist Government is to
be regarded as that of a foreign sovereign state appears to be
a question of law to be answered in the light of the preceding
statements and having regard to the particular issue with re-
spect to which the question is raised.64
This attitude of the Foreign Office, that it is only finding facts, is more
consistent with a declaratory than with a constitutive view of the na-
ture of recognition. 65
Even the recent criticism of the use of sovereign immunity in what
are essentially commercial cases has generally stopped short of advocat-
ing the physical levying of execution against property in the possession
of a foreign sovereign. 66 In one American case, 67 the Department of
State did not intervene to prevent trial or judgment, but did file a
suggestion to prevent attachment of assets of the foreign state. Two
British cases in the past decade seem to have turned on the question of
02 [1938] A.C. 485.
63 [1939] A.C. 256.
64 The Arantzazu Mendi [1938] P. 233, 242.
05 Of course, a state may extend immunity further than it is required to do by the gen-
eral international law. When it does so, it is acting constitutively. The grant of immunity
by the British courts to protected princes and their governments would come within this
category. Duff Development Co. v. Kelantan Government, [1923] A.C. 895; Mighell v. Sultan
of Johore, [1894] 1 Q.B. 149. Privileges granted to a resident government-in-exile might be
another example.
06 Cf. Note, Sovereign Immunity, Waiver and Execution: Arguments from Continental
Jurisprudence, 74 YALE L.J. 887, 910-14 (1965), which is critical of this practice.
67 Weilamann v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 192 N.Y.S.2d 469 (Sup. Ct. 1959). See also
Drachsler, Some Observations on the Current Status of the Tate Letter, 54 Am. J. INT'L L.
790 (1960).
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fictional possession,68 but this distinction has now been authoritatively
repudiated in favor of a general immunity against being impleaded.69
Either way, the courts are preventing open confrontations between state
powers. While recognition is only indirectly involved in these cases,
the dangers of physical confrontations are equally great regardless of
the legal status of the government involved. A declaratory view seems
necessary, although it may be supplemented with additional immuni-
ties.
Thus, in interstate relations, it seems that the declaratory theory
must prevail. This does not, however, preclude the creation of inter-
national organizations as special personae in international law by
constitutive means. Just as domestic legal systems first recognized only
living persons and then later allowed the constitution of artificial
corporations, international law may recognize communities which ful-
fill the requirements of states as its primary personae and also allow
the constitution of organizations with international legal personality.70
B. The External Sphere of Action: Political Questions
Political questions are those issues in spheres of interstate relation-
ships in which there are no existing clear legal obligations. Since they
involve acts of states or governments vis-ii-vis one another, one might
argue that they are merely a subgroup of the previous classification.
Since, by definition, these political questions involve issues where there
is no strict international law duty to act or to refrain from acting, the
effect of the law in this field is entirely different from that in the former
field. Since there is no duty to act, refusal to act cannot be wrongful.
And if refusal to act is not wrongful, despite the factual existence of
state or governmental qualifications, then the standard involved is the
equivalent of a constitutive one.7 1
Much confusion has been generated by the use of the word "recog-
nition" to describe entry into diplomatic relations. The two concepts
should be clearly distinguished, although the latter may correctly be
called "diplomatic recognition" or "political recognition." Recognition
of a state implies the acceptance by one state of another into the legal
framework of international law. The recognized state becomes a crea-
68 Juan Ysmael 9: Co. v. Indonesia, [1955] A.C. 72 (P.C.); United States v. Dollfus Mieg
et Cie., [1952] A.C. 582.
69 Rahimtoola v. Nizam of Hyderabad, [1958] A.C. 379.
70 Cf. Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, [1949] I.C.J.
174.
71 It is not, strictly speaking, constitutive, since the action of the recognizing state does
not "constitute" the recognized state in international law. For the recognizing state, how-
ever, the result is the same, since it is under no international duty to act.
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ture of that international law, capable of holding rights and duties
under it. Recognition of a government is acceptance of it as the lawful
agent of that state. The establishment of diplomatic relations is, how-
ever, only the creation of formal means of communication between the
governments of two states. Abstention from diplomatic intercourse may
imply political and possibly total nonintercourse between two states,
but it need not imply nonrecognition. The breach of diplomatic rela-
tions can imply nonrecognition only when the government in one of
the states has never been recognized by the government in the other,
and even then the nonrecognition is only at the governmental and not
at the state level. If a changing policy occasions the breach, but there
is continuity of personnel administering the states involved, govern-
mental recognition clearly continues.
Entry into diplomatic relations is certainly not required by positive
international law. Indeed, for most states the entry into direct diplo-
matic relations with every other state would be a practical impossi-
bility. For the major powers and for those having regular dealings with
one another, regular diplomatic communication is certainly desirable,
but even in its absence communication between states is usually possi-
ble. This can be by informal negotiations carried on by commissioners, 2
or by conferences at third capitals or at international assemblies, 73 or
through the use of the good offices of some third state. 4 At worst diplo-
matic nonintercourse causes serious inconvenience. It is a situation
which should be avoided as far as possible, especially by the major
powers, but it cannot be described as illegal.
The exchange of diplomatic representatives has frequently been used
to imply recognition of a foreign state or its government. Indeed, it has
sometimes been used, especially in inter-American relations, to imply
approval of a new government. Similarly, the withholding of represen-
tation has been used to express disapproval of the political situation
obtaining within some other state.75
There has been one recent proposal for a differentiated policy of
recognition (presumably meaning "political recognition") within the
western hemisphere.7 6 Under this proposal, American nations could ex-
press their collective disapproval of antidemocratic revolutions within
72 As in the case of the Eastern European states before their recognition. TaE LAw o
NATIONS 107 (Briggs ed. 1952).
73 As in the case of the American-Chinese exchanges at Warsaw.
74 As is usually the case when there has been a rupture of diplomatic relations, e.g., the
Swiss representation of United States interests in Cuba and vice versa.
75 See authorities cited notes 88 & 39 supra.
76 Fenwick, The Recognition of de facto Governments: Is There a Basis for Inter-Amer-
ican Collective Action?, 58 AM. J. INT'L L. 109 (1964).
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the hemisphere by withholding or restricting diplomatic representa-
tion. The proposal leaves, however, a number of questions unanswered.
Are the laws of the unrecognized government 77 to be given extraterri-
torial effect in the nonrecognizing states? Is the property of the state
with the unrecognized government to be frozen as ownerless in the non-
recognizing states? The exact extent of this nonrecognition is un-
specified.
According to Fenwick, a proponent of collective and public denun-
ciation of undesirable governments, 78 past examples indicate that
nonrecognition, if only it had been collective, would have been suc-
cessful. Two reasons make this solution undesirable: one of them is
applicable if it is effective, the other if it is ineffective.
If this sort of nonrecognition is effective, it tends to subvert national
sovereignty. In itself, this is no shortcoming in a world which is in-
creasingly relinquishing national claims for regional and global ones.
Collective diplomatic disapprobation by a regional or global organiza-
tion is certainly to be preferred to that by a single state. Nevertheless,
until there is more general consensus on particular regional or global
standards of legitimacy, such interference is of questionable justifica-
tion. Is the international body to decide on the basis of the degree of
consent of the population to the new government, or is it to decide on
the basis of the social program of the new government? Fenwick leaves
these questions unanswered, giving only a political method for deter-
mining the result, not a rule by which it is to be determined.
The more serious obstacle to such a policy of nonrecognition is that
of its probable ineffectiveness. Fenwick may be too optimistic in his
appraisal of the effectiveness of collective action. New regimes may seek
recognition by other powers to strengthen their internal positions.
Nevertheless, nonrecognition in the inter-American context has gen-
erally meant only the withholding of exchange of diplomatic repre-
sentatives and the withholding of entry into political relations. While
either of these policies may hurt a new government, neither is neces-
sarily fatal. Unless the nonrecognizing states are willing to take steps
to impose an effective nonrecognition by the imposition of embargoes
and the refusal of transit facilities, and to make this nonrecognition
effective against extra-American powers, a policy of nonrecognition will
frequently (although not always) be ineffectual. As Williams said of the
Stimson Doctrine, "the mere blowing of horns is of little value unless
the blowers are prepared to follow up their notes in some effective
77 In the inter-American case only governmental recognition would seem likely to arise.
78 Fenwick, supra note 76, at ili.
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manner." 79 Indeed, the American position on China shows that such
trumpeting may inextricably involve one in a melody of disapprobation,
long after the tune has become monotonous. The seeming failure of
nearly total global nonrecognition of the independence of Southern
Rhodesia to provide more than marginal effects on the government or
economy of that territory should serve as a warning to those who have
hopes for the democratizing effects of such a policy.80
Thus, even the political effect of diplomatic nonrecognition may be
dubious. It should, however, be clear that the failure to exchange rep-
resentatives or the withdrawal of diplomatic representation already
granted has no necessary legal consequence. This, like the negotiation
of treaties and the granting of visas (to name only two obvious exam-
ples), is a discretionary matter. Since it is discretionary, a declaratory
standard for this class of recognition would be meaningless.
C. The Internal Sphere of Action
When the scene of contest changes from that external to the recog-
nizing state to that internal to it, other considerations apply. No longer
is the main consideration that of the preservation of international
peace; there are also considerations of the type of internal order which
the recognizing state wishes to preserve. In this sphere of action, more
than in the previous ones, one must examine the particular interna-
tional law of each state, and try to distill a general standard from basic
agreements. Whether each of these particular standards is sufficient to
meet the minimum general standard thus obtained will raise questions
of state responsibility.
Within this category, three types of cases arise. First, there are those
79 Williams, Some Thoughts on the Doctrine of Recognition in International Law, 47
HARv. L. REv. 776, 791 (1934).
80 See U.N. Sec C. Res. No. 232 (1966), implemented in the United States by Exec. Ord.
No. 11322, 82 Fed. Reg. 119 (1967).
Along these lines, Fenwick questions the justice of imposing treaty obligations upon a
state which has an unrepresentative government. He would argue that nonrecognition of
these regimes would prevent the imposition of onerous obligations upon an unwilling
populace. Fenwick, supra note 76, at 111. However well-meaning, this seems an erroneous
argument. Recognition does not impose treaty obligations: the negotiation of treaties does.
Neither recognition nor the exchange of diplomatic representatives implies the negotiation
of treaties. Indeed, unless some way is found to make the negotiation of treaties impossible
not only for nonrecognizing states but for all others as well, there is no improvement in
the situation of the oppressed people of the unrecognized state, for states which would be
willing to enter into treaties with unrepresentative regimes would presumably not cooper-
ate in a policy of nonrecognition. To be effective, Fenwick's collective nonrecognition would
have to be universal, binding not only other American states (whether or not they favored
the policy) but also all other states (even though they did not participate in the determina-
tion).
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cases in which unrecognized governments have applied their law to
persons or chattels physically within their jurisdiction, which later
come within the nonrecognizing jurisdiction. Second, there are those
cases in which an unrecognized government seeks to affect persons,
chattels, or choses in action within the nonrecognizing state through
extraterritorial application of its own law. Finally, there are those cases
in which the unrecognized government seeks to participate directly,
either by entering into contracts or by claiming assets standing in the
name of the state.
1. Adjudications Regarding the Operation of Foreign Law in For-
eign Territory. In the first of these cases, legislation or adjudicative
action may operate to change the status or rights and duties of persons
or the ownership of property physically under the control of an un-
recognized government, whether in a recognized or an unrecognized
state. In such cases the courts of another state are involved only if the
persons or chattels later come within their jurisdiction. The effect of
the legislation is not really extraterritorial; indeed it is, in its first ap-
plication, purely internal.
In these cases, both commercial and general convenience dictate that
a declaratory approach be used, although the authority making the
declaration of fact need not be the courts. Persons are married and di-
vorced, are born and die, without respect to the international status of
the government under which they live. Property is bought and sold in
a like manner. General convenience would dictate that these ordinary
human transactions be given their ordinary consequences, without re-
gard to the political constitution under which they take place. Com-
mercial convenience, which requires rules like those protecting the
purchaser for value in domestic systems,81 would seem to indicate that
this is a useful rule for the international legal system.
Where the acts brought into question would ordinarily be recog-
nized in a domestic court if the state were recognized, there seems to be
little controversy that the courts should enforce the foreign act, even
though the government there is not officially and formally recognized
for political purposes by the foreign office of the forum state.82 Justice
81 Cf. UNIFORM COMMERCUAL CODE § 2-403(1).
82 The locus classicus of this doctrine is the statement of Chief Judge Pound of the New
York Court of Appeals in Salimoff v. Standard Oil, 262 N.Y. 220, 226-28, 186 N.E. 679,
682-83 (1933):
"As a juristic conception, what is Soviet Russia? A band of robbers or a government?
We all know that it is a government. The State Department knows it, the courts, the na-
tions and the man on the street. If it is a government in fact, its decrees have force within
its own borders and over its nationals....
"The legitimate conclusion is that the existing government cannot be ignored by the
courts of this state, so far as the validity of its acts in Russia are concerned....
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Breitel of the New York Appellate Division recently summarized this
doctrine in a case involving a commercial transaction in which the East
German government had been involved:
A foreign government, although not recognized by the po-
litical arm of the United States Government, may nevertheless
have de facto existence which is juridically cognizable. The
acts of such a de facto government may affect private rights
and obligations arising either as a result of activity in, or with
persons or corporations within, the territory controlled by
such de facto government.8 3
Until the recent decision of the House of Lords in Carl-Zeiss Stiftung
v. Rayner & Keeler Ltd., 4 the British cases appeared to indicate a simi-
lar development.8 5 Indeed, in his speech in judgment, Lord Wilber-
force indicated that the question might still be open in Britain, due to
the fictions used in the determination of the instant case."6 The British
courts did not themselves take judicial notice of political conditions in
overseas areas, but rather left this factual determination to the conclu-
sive statement of the Foreign Office. The Foreign Office, in its turn,
"Nonrecognition is no answer to defendant's contention, no reason for regarding as of
no legal effect the laws of an unrecognized government ruling by force, as the Soviet gov-
ernment in Russia concededly was. 'Within its own territory the Soviet was a sovereign
power.'"
83 Upright v. Mercury Business Machines Co., 13 App. Div. 2d 36, 38, 213 N.Y.S.2d 417,
419 (1961).
84 [1966] 3 W.L.R. 125 (H.L.). The case reached the House of Lords on a procedural point.
To use American terminology, the defendants had moved to dismiss the suit (which was
for infringement of a trademark) on the ground that the plaintiff had not consented to the
filing of the action by the solicitors who had obtained the summons (writ). Whether the
plaintiff had consented to the suit turned upon the composition of the governing board of
the Zeiss Foundation; this question turned upon East German legislation reorganizing cer-
tain local governmental units. (A second issue of estoppel by foreign judgment is not rele-
vant here). The defendants first raised the recognition point in the Court of Appeal, which
requested a certificate from the Foreign Office. [1965] 1 Ch. 525 (C.A.). The Court of Appeal
then held that, since the East German government was unrecognized, its legislation could
not be noticed, and therefore the plaintiff had not consented to the suit. [1965] 1 Ch. 596
(C.A.). On appeal, the House of Lords held that, although the East German government
was unrecognized, it could be construed to be the agent of the Russian government, and its
legislation could be noticed. The case was remanded for trial on the merits. For a discussion
of the case, see Greig, The Carl Zeiss Case and the Position of an Unrecognized Government
in English Law, 83 L.Q. REv. 96 (1967).
85 Thus, in Luther v. Sagor, [1921] 1 K.B. 456, the trial court refused to recognize an
expropriation by the Communist government in Russia, but when the Foreign Office cer-
tified to the Court of Appeal that the Soviet government was actually in control of the ter-
ritory, it reversed the decision. [1921] 3 K.B. 532 (C.A.). For the certificate, see [1921] id. at
536-537. In that case, however, the agreement according recognition had been expressly
limited so that the laws of neither state would have extraterritorial effect in the other state.
86 [1966] 3 W.L.R. 125, 178 (H.L.).
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seems to have been willing to certify facts which were not necessarily
in accordance with the official political recognition policies of the gov-
ernment.8 7 In the Carl-Zeiss case, on the other hand, the Foreign Office
did not state the factual conditions obtaining in East Germany, but
rather gave its conclusions as to the legitimacy of the East German gov-
ernment.88 Whether this was due to a change in British recognition
policy 9 or to the failure of the Court of Appeal to put the correct ques-
tion to the Foreign Office 90 is unclear.91
Other recent British cases show that, at least after the government
has granted political recognition to a foreign government, the highest
British tribunal will differentiate between two classes of cases. Foreign
legislation is effective for the internal purposes of the foreign state from
the date of effective occupation of the territory by the new government,
87 See the certificate paraphrased in Banco de Bilbao v. Sancha, [1938] 2 K.B. 176, 181:
"[T]hat the Government set up by General Franco in the Basque country since his capture
of Bilbao on June 19, 1937, is now recognized by His Majesty's Government as the Gov-
ernment which exercises de facto administrative control over a considerable portion of the
Basque country, including Bilbao.... It appears that notwithstanding recognition by His
Majesty's Government of the de facto position of General Franco's Government in this
area, His Majesty's Government recognises the Republican Government of Spain as the de
jure Government of the whole of Spain including the area in which it recognizes General
Franco's Government as exercising de facto administrative control." Cf. the certificate in
The Arantzazu Mendi [1938] P. 232, cited in part in text accompanying note 64 supra.
88 The certificate is set out in part in the judgment of Lord Justice Harman, [1965] Ch.
596, 637-638: "Since June 1945 'and up to the present date, Her Majesty's Government
have recognized the State and Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as
de jure entitled to exercise governing authority in respect of that zone. In matters affecting
Germany as a whole, the States and Governments of the French Republic, the United King-
dom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, and the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics were jointly entitled to exercise governing authority. In the
period from August 30, 1945, to March 20, 1948, they did exercise such joint authority
through the Control Council for Germany. Apart from the States, Governments and Con-
trol Council aforementioned, Her Majesty's Government have not recognised either de jure
or de facto any other authority purporting to exercise governing authority in or in respect
of the zone.'"
80 As Lord Reid seems to indicate at [1966] 3 W.L.R. 137, in citing a 1951 speech by Mr.
Herbert Morrison, then Foreign Secretary. It should be noted that the British and Ameri-
can Governments seem to refuse political recognition in apparently similar quantities.
Neither recognizes North Viet Nam, North Korea, or East Germany. The United States does
not recognize Communist China, while the United Kingdom does not recognize Nationalist
China.
90 One can only conjecture what (if any) reply the Foreign Office would have made to a
question put thus: "Do the authorities calling themselves the German Democratic Republic
exercise effective governmental control in the relevant territory?"
91 By importing an additional consideration, the House of Lords reached a conclusion
not inconsistent with that urged by this comment. The House found the East German law
effective because the Russians were the legitimate authority and the German Democratic
Republic was presumably acting as their agent. In the instant case the "agency" may be
real, but in some future case could an "agency" be presumed where none exists? If so, the
effective government might always be recognized.
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while extraterritorial effectiveness is postponed until the date of formal
recognition. 92 In cases involving internal effectiveness, the Foreign
Office statement is apparently treated as a conclusive statement of fact,
while in those involving extraterritorial application, the certificate is
apparently treated as of constitutive effect. In other words, in the one
set of cases, recognition is declaratory, while in the other it is consti-
tutive.
Treating the problem solely in terms of recognition overlooks two
vitally important factors in the decision of many of the cases involving
property rights. These are the actions of foreign states which are con-
trary to the minimum standards of international law and actions of
foreign states which are contrary to the public policy of the forum state.
The most recent cases to arise in these fields have involved recognized,
rather than unrecognized, states or governments,9 3 but their import
makes their treatment here necessary.
In his dissent in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,4 Mr. Justice
White canvasses the problem of foreign acts contrary to minimum stan-
dards of international law.95 He argues that the courts are required to
adjudicate cases and must take general international law into account
in such adjudication. While this may be true, it is also arguable that
the taking of private property by the state is not illegal, but only the
denial of compensation makes it so. If this is the case, the expropriating
state may be liable for compensation, without giving the former owner
recourse against the goods themselves. A claim against the state for
liquidated damages would, of course, be unenforceable because of the
defense of sovereign immunity.96 Justice Harlan, speaking for the ma-
jority of the Supreme Court, cogently argued that, while the general
international law might treat the expropriation as a delict, it could not
92 Gdynia-Ameryka Linie v. Boguslawski, [1953] A.C. 11 (H.L.); Civil Air Transport Inc.
v. Central Air Transport Corp., [1 9 53] A.C. 70 (P.C.).
93 Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres S. A., 163 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1947) and Bernstein v.
N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij, 173 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1949),
210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954) (confiscation by recognized, but enemy, government); and Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 876 U.S. 398 (1964) (expropriation by recognized but un-
friendly, government).
94 376 U.S. 398, 439 (1964). The case involved the nationalization of sugar aboard a ship
in Cuban territorial waters. The Supreme Court applied the "act of state" doctrine and
acknowledged the validity of the seizure. For subsequent related litigation, see Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 243 F. Supp. 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
95 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 450-56 (1964).
96 Compare the position of the previous owner of goods sold under a statutory provision
giving the innocent purchaser for value good title despite the voidable title of his vendor.
He has no recourse against the goods or against their new owner. His only remedy is dam-
ages against the vendor for conversion. This may be equally futile, since such a vendor usu-
ally has either absconded or has dissipated the proceeds.
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compel the domestic or particular law to treat it as invalid: "[T]he
public law of nations can hardly dictate to a country which is in theory
wronged how to treat that wrong within its domestic borders.19 7
For suits instituted before 1966, Congress authoritatively accepted
the view of Mr. Justice White. By the Hickenlooper amendment to the
Foreign Aid Act of 1964, it required the courts to adjudicate the va-
lidity of such seizures at international law.98
The second argument, based on the public policy of the forum state,
is less appropriate where the expropriation takes place in foreign terri-
tory than where the expropriating state attempts to extend its laws
extraterritorially. It will be discussed in more detail in connection with
the latter class of cases. In making a determination about the legal effi-
cacy of acts which happened abroad, the courts are essentially determin-
ing factual issues (who was "owner" or "possessor" when the property
entered this jurisdiction?) and not legal ones (was that ownership right-
fully acquired?). 99
From a more practical point of view, considerations of justice and
the efficiency of its administration would seem to indicate that more
equitable results can be reached through the consolidation of claims by
the State Department, acting in the nature of a trustee in bankruptcy,
than by allowing each individual claimant to pursue assorted chattels
throughout the world. International trade would be complicated by
leaving the pursuit to the individual. While trade is not the ultima
ratio of international law, neither should its claims be lightly ignored.
More substantial justice is provided for all claimants if it is rendered
without the accident of the presence of expropriated goods within the
jurisdiction.
Thus, a declaratory view is suggested for the recognition of govern-
mental actions which take their immediate effect within the territory
controlled by the unrecognized government. This view has a rationale
97 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964).
98 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) provides: "Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court
in the United States shall decline on the ground of the federal act of state doctrine to make
a determination on the merits giving effect to the principles of international law in a case
in which a claim of title or other right is asserted by any party including a foreign state
(or a party claiming through such state) based upon (or traced through) a confiscation or
other taking after January 1, 1959, by an act of that state in violation of the principles of
international law, including the principles of compensation and other standards set out in
this subsection: Provided, That this subparagraph shall not be applicable.. . (3) in any
case in which the proceedings are commenced after January 1, 1966."
99 If, at the relevant time, the property is within a third state, then the question of rec-
ognition or nonrecognition of the extraterritorial character of the legislative acts of an
unrecognized government should turn on the status of that government in the eyes of the
third state and the applicable public policy there.
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different from that suggested above for external acts of governments.
That was largely based on a need to prevent hostile confrontations be-
tween governments; this is based on commercial convenience and gen-
eral public utility.
2. The Extraterritorial Application of Foreign Law in Domestic
Territory. In the second type of case arising in the internal sphere of
action, the goods or other rights to which the foreign government seeks
to transfer title or with which it otherwise attempts to deal are physi-
cally located within the nonrecognizing state. Here other considerations
of domestic public policy apply. As Mr. Justice Stone said in answering
a claim to general retroactivity'00 of recognition in Guaranty Trust Co.
v. United States:
The argument thus ignores the distinction between the effect
of our recognition of a foreign government with respect to its
acts within its own territory prior to recognition, and the ef-
fect upon previous transactions consummated here between
its predecessor and our own nationals. The one operates only
to validate to a limited extent acts of a de facto government
which by virtue of the recognition, has became a government
de jure. But it does not follow that recognition renders of no
effect transactions here with a prior recognized government in
conformity to the declared policy of our own Government.
The very purpose of the recognition by our Government is
that our nationals may be conclusively advised with what gov-
ernment they may safely carry on business transactions and
who its representatives are. If those transactions, valid when
entered into, were to be disregarded after the later recognition
of a successor government, recognition would be but an idle
ceremony, yielding none of the advantages of established
diplomatic relations .... 101
Thus in cases involving extraterritorial operation of foreign laws or
direct involvement of the foreign government in commercial transac-
tions, the political recognition will be the controlling factor, if the
application of the foreign law or the transaction involved is to take
place within the forum state.
100 Many of the cases speak of "retroactivity" of the official political recognition. This is
only because of the time sequence involved in them. Before the litigation commenced (or
before it reached the appellate level), political recognition was granted. Hence the question
could be framed as one of retroactivity of the political recognition, rather than as one of the
immediate efficacy of a government within its territory. For a case in which governmental
efficacy was the test, despite continuing political non-recognition, see Upright v. Mercury
Business Machines Co., 13 App. Div. 2d 36, 213 N.Y.S.2d 417 (1961); note 83 and accompany-
ing text supra.
101 304 U.S. 126, 140 (1938).
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Here questions of the public policy of the forum state must be more
closely considered. Domestic courts are being asked directly to enforce
foreign law, not merely to recognize the enforcement of it by the foreign
state.102 The public policy of the forum state must be taken into con-
sideration.103
If transactions take place within a nonrecognizing state, based on
legal titles existing there at the time of the transactions, it would seem
inconvenient and unjust for retroactivity of recognition to invalidate
these transactions and the titles created by them. If property is held in
the name of a state or of a foreign corporation or citizen, the purchaser
of such property should not be put to the risk of the vagaries of foreign
affairs. If the government of the forum state gives political recognition
to the old regime as the lawful government of some territory, it seems
inconsistent that it can later divest those who relied upon its determina-
tion of their titles to property.
On the other hand, if the title to the property remains in the foreign
state, its corporations, or citizens at the time of granting of political
recognition, the new government can take action regarding it. Indeed,
its earlier laws, ineffective in the forum state until the granting of
political recognition, can take effect at that time. This was the situation
102 See Republic of Iraq v. First Nat'l City Bank, 353 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1965), in which
the Second Circuit refused to allow enforcement of an Iraqi decree confiscating the property
of the deposed (and deceased) monarch, King Faisal, including some in the possession of a
New York bank, because confiscation-even of the property of a head of state-was contrary
to our public policy.
The refusal of courts to enforce foreign revenue or penal legislation is another example
of the reluctance of our judicial authorities to apply laws contrary to local public policy,
although Mr. Justice White in Sabbatino cites it for the opposite proposition. If the transfer
of title contemplated by such legislation has been perfected by the competent courts within
the foreign territory, American courts will not go behind the declaration. See Wisconsin
v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, 291 (1888): "It is true that if the prosecution in the courts
of one country for a violation of its municipal law is in rem, to obtain a forfeiture of
specific property within its jurisdiction, a judgment of forfeiture, rendered after due notice,
and vesting the title of the property in the State, will be recognized and upheld in the
courts of any other country in which the title to the property is brought in issue." The
other Supreme Court cases cited by Mr. Justice White in Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 448 n.9,
all turn on the failure of the foreign state to perfect its claim within its own territory
before asserting it within the United States. The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825);
Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657 (1892); cf. Moore v. Mitchell, 30 F.2d 600 (2d Cir. 1929).
103 In spite of the seemingly contrary rule in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938), American courts have applied a national public policy, rather than the public poli-
cies of the several states. See Jessup, The Doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins Applied
to International Law, 33 Am. J. INTL L. 740 (1939), and Henkin, The Foreign Affairs Power
of the Federal Courts: Sabbatino, 64 COLtm. L. RFv. 805 (1964). This is surely a peculiarly
local problem, not relevant to general international law. Strong arguments for it are given
in United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 221-26 (1942), and Banco Nacdonal de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425-27 (1964).
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in United States v. Pink.1 4 No attempt was made by the United States
Government to recover assets which had been actually disbursed by the
receiver for the Russian insurance company before the date of the
Litvinov assignment. Justice Douglas, in the opinion of the Court,
skirted the question of whether the other disbursements ordered by
the New York court had "vested,"'' 1 5 but the assumption seems to have
been that, because of the intervention of the United States before the
distribution was actually made, they did not. Thus, the Court treated
the undistributed assets of the insurance company as the property of
the Soviet Government at the time of political recognition.
British courts have followed the same distinction between acts which
take place abroad and those which can take effect only through extra-
territorial operation of legislation within the United Kingdom. In
Gdynia-Ameryka Linie v. Boguslawski'06 the House of Lords differ-
entiated between those acts of the Polish government which took place
within the territory under its immediate control, which were valid
from the beginning of such control, and those acts which could only
take effect outside of Polish territory, through extraterritorial operation
of Polish law, which were valid only from the date that formal recogni-
tion was conferred. Lord Oaksey specifically said, "I . . . support the
view that retroactivity of recognition should be confined to spheres
of de facto control."''0 7 Lord Porter drew the same distinction on the
basis of an apparently fictional criterion of control. 0 8 A similar result
was reached by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Civil
Air Transport Inc. v. Central Air Transport Corp.09 in which Viscount
Simon, speaking for the Board, said, "[T]he validity of the transaction
must be judged as at the date when it was entered into, and not in the
light of subsequent events, which might have turned out differently.""' 0
Continental courts have generally followed a practice similar to that
of the American and British courts in refusing to recognize the extra-
territoriality of decrees of unrecognized governments. Thus, the Czarist
law regarding corporations or property was applied by French, Belgian,
104 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
105 Id. at 226-228.
106 [1953] A.C. 11 (H.L.).
107 Id. at 39.
108 "Therefore, although I am prepared to accept that the recognition of the new gov-
ernment dates back to June 28 in Poland where that government had effective control, I
am of the opinion that that control did not extend to the old government or the Polish
merchant fleet and its personnel until July 6 ...." Id. at 29. June 28 was the date upon
which the new government began operation in Poland. July 6 was the date upon which
it was politically recognized by Great Britain.
109 [1953] A.C. 70 (P.C.).
110 Id. at 91.
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Italian and Egyptian courts during the decade after the Czarist govern-
ment had ceased to exist."' Mann was able to cite only one Swiss case
in which a different result was reached,112 and suggests that German
and Austrian courts may have pursued the same line of reasoning.
Lauterpacht found one Dutch case in the same vein.113 Even if inter-
national practice varies, it does not disprove this thesis, since the par-
ticular international law of some states might vary from the general
standard. In matters involving private law, the general international
law provides only a broad minimum framework, but not necessarily the
explicit norms.
A constitutive view is hence indicated, but not required, in these
cases, since it is not reasonable to ask the domestic courts of one state
to sit in judgment on the political quarrels of another. Such action
would be as unfortunate diplomatically as it would be inappropriate
judicially. In the first type of cases involving internal legal action in the
foreign state, judicial determination of a state of facts was necessary.
That determination did not extend to questions of legitimacy, which
are not easily justiciable. Barring authoritative international deter-
mination regarding recognition (an improbable solution, given present
circumstances), certification of recognition by each foreign office seems
the only practical course of action. During a period of internal con-
flict in some foreign state, courts in another state can simply block the
assets of that state, to await the outcome there."" Such a course of ac-
tion would seem unwise, for it obstructs a government still recognized
as legitimate by the forum state, and thus gives implicit assistance to
the insurgency.
Thus recognition must take on a constitutive character when the im-
mediate problem is the extension of the effectiveness of foreign law
into the recognizing state. And here political recognition may play
some role as evidence of the constitutive act.
3. Direct Participation of the Foreign State in Domestic Courts. The
third type of internal case, mentioned above, involves direct participa-
tion by the foreign state. Here the same considerations seem to apply
111 See the cases cited by Mann, Judiciary & Executive in Foreign Affairs, 29 TRANSACONS
OF THE GROTiUS Soc=TY 143, 168 (1943).
112 Id. at 158. This case involved a divorce sought in Switzerland by one Russian against
another. Swiss law would allow the divorce of foreigners only if the home state of the par-
ties would recognize it. Thus the case did not directly involve extraterritorial application
of the legislation of the unrecognized government.
113 LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNrTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 153 (1947).
114 Bank of China v. Wells Fargo Bank, 92 F. Supp. 920 (N.D. Cal. 1950); a similar result
was accomplished by the delay between trial and appeal in Luther v. Sagor, [1921] 1 K.B.
456, [1921] 3 K.B. 532 (CA.); and in Haile Selassie v. Cable and Wireless, Ltd. [1939] 1 Ch.
182 (CA.).
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as in the immediately previous sub-class, and recognition again appears
to be constitutive in nature. American, British, and Norwegian courts
have refused to allow suits to be brought by unrecognized foreign gov-
ernments.11 5 The dictum of Mr. Justice Stone in Guaranty Trust Co. v.
United States quoted above applies directly.
If no government is recognized politically, the result would appar-
ently be to block the assets of the state, leaving them in the hands of
whatever private custodians may have possession. If some government
is officially recognized by the foreign office, it will be able to dispose of
the state assets, whether it is in actual control of the state territory or
not. Such an authoritative and public decision about recognition seems
preferable to leaving the question to the private judgment of the
custodians where the transfer of ownership is irregular. If the state in
which the assets are located wrongfully neglects to make a declaration
of recognition for this purpose, it may be incurring an international
delict analogous to denial of justice. This responsibility should not be
extended to each private custodian or purchaser.
IV. CONCLUSION
To find the true nature of recognition, one must examine its several
functions. Such examination shows that both constitutive and declara-
tory theories have some, but not total, validity. Three main functions
of recognition must be separately considered:
A. In the general international law which imposes state responsi-
bility for external actions, recognition is granted by a declaratory pro-
cess. Such an approach is necessary in order to avoid the possibility of
hostile confrontations. Any community which meets the standards of
statehood must be treated with all the respect due to a foreign state.
B. This declaratory standard does not apply to matters which inter-
national law leaves to the discretion of each state, such as the exchange
of diplomatic representatives, which may be called political recogni-
tion. Since these matters are merely discretionary, the constitutive
theory provides a better description of them.
C. In cases involving private law transactions, considerations of com-
mercial and general convenience dictate that acts of an unrecognized
government taking effect upon persons or chattels within its physical
control be recognized if these persons or chattels later come within
another jurisdiction. Hence, recognition of foreign acts which take
115 Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic v. Cibrario, 235 N.Y. 255 (1923), 139 N.E.
259; City of Berne v. Bank of England, 9 Ves. Jun. 347, 32 Eng. Rep. 636 (Ch. 1804); Spanish
Gov't v. Campuzano, Annual Digest 1938-1940, cas. no. 27 (Sup. Ct. Norway 1938). See also
NoKL-HaEry, Las GouvEREmENTS DE FAr DEvANT LE JuGE 125-27 (1927).
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place abroad is properly declaratory. The same considerations, however,
dictate the opposite result in relation to acts-in-the-law of the nonrecog-
nizing state, especially when the unrecognized government attempts
to apply its legislation or directly to claim assets located in the non-
recognizing state. Here recognition is properly constitutive.
The current problems in the Middle East (which most recently
erupted after the copy for this comment was out of the hands of the
author) can illustrate the first two of these points. No one can doubt
that Israel exists in fact. The declaratory approach, summarized in
point A, requires that other states recognize the territorial integrity
and other fundamental rights of Israel. Only by such action can wars
like the brief but bloody Arab-Israeli conflict of this year be prevented.
It is the existence of Israel, and not its legitimacy in the eyes of the
Arabs, which gives its military forces the capability to attack and to
defend. As point B indicates, the Arab states need grant nothing further
than these bare fundamental rights. They need not enter into diplo-
matic relations, trading agreements, treaties, or grant other concessions
which are discretionary. Of course, a problem of classification arises:
Is Egypt required by international law to grant passage through the
Straits of Tiran or is that simply a matter of discretion? Such questions
raise fresh problems of international law which are beyond the scope
of this comment.
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